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Collings: Criminal Law

Criminal Law and Procedure
by Rex A. Collings, lr.*

I should see the garden far better
if I could get to the top of that hill: and
here's a path that leads straight to it
But how curiously it twists! It's more like a
corkscrew than a path!
When one commences with a Lewis Carroll quotation, l it
is customary to depart with a Cheshire grin. I propose to
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1. Cf. Dalbey, Alice Would Have
Questions Traveling in a Police Patrol
Car, 1 J.Cal.L.Enf. 139 (1967). The
author suggests that if Lewis Carroll
were writing about Alice today, he
would put her in a patrol car instead
of sending her down a rabbit hole. This
way he could arrange for her to discover a topsy-turvy world more simply.
Unfortunately, Alice in Wonderland
was a dream. The patrol car is real.
Take a ride with a patrol officer and
see the topsy-turvy world, suggests Mr.
Dalbey.
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do otherwise. I propose to needle the California Supreme
Court. It needs needling. Or is it a Holy of Holies that
cannot stand having its veil rent in twain?
When I agreed to discuss the work of the courts during the
period of October 1, 1966 to September 30, 1967, I did not
realize the magnitude of the task. During that period there
were 100 (my research assistant says 99) California Supreme
Court decisions dealing with criminal law and procedure.
During the same period there were only 91 noncriminal
decisions. The proportions of courts of appeal decisions are
comparable. Of the 100 California Supreme Court cases,
26 were death-penalty cases with automatic appeal under
Penal Code section 1239 (b).
It is frustrating to be faced with so many decisions. In the
first place, one must neglect federal cases, particularly Supreme Court decisions binding the California courts. In the
second place, one must give rather inadequate treatment even
to the California Supreme Court decisions. s Finally, there is
almost no time to devote to decisions in courts of appeal,
although many of these decisions have important implications.
Accordingly, the present treatment must of necessity be somewhat limited in scope.
Probably the single most important development of the
year came from the Joint Committee for the Revision of the
Penal Code. s That committee, through its project director,
Professor Arthur H. Sherry of the University of California,
Berkeley, published its Tentative Draft No.1. The draft
deals with general principles of liability, defenses, kidnapping
and related crimes, sex crimes and arson. Other drafts are
expected in the near future. It is hoped that the ultimate
result will be a modernization of the Penal Code of 1872,
2. For an excellent and thorough
discussion of a few decisions, see Comment, The Supreme Court of California
1966-1967, 55 CAL.L.REV. 1059, 1123
(1967).
3. The background of the Joint Committee and the procedure being followed
are outlined in its 1967 report to the
368
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Governor and legislature. Copies of
Tentative Draft No. 1 may be procured
from the Project office, Joint Committee for the Revision of the Penal
Code, School of Law, Boalt Hall,
University of California, Berkeley. The
Joint Committee and Project Director
will be delighted to receive comments.
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which is badly in need of clarification and revision. Since
1872, there has never been a continuing and coordinated
effort to develop a coherent and comprehensive code.
Tentative Draft No. 1 consists of basic provisions which
are largely uncontroversial. It should be read with Tentative
Draft No.2, which will include the basic sentencing provisions.
The only proposal in the draft which may be controversial is
the treatment of deviate sexual relations between consenting
adults as noncriminal. Currently, a normal sexual relationship between consenting adults is deemed noncriminal, unless
the relationship ripens into a pretended marriage. 4 "Statutory rape" would be somewhat narrowed under the proposal.
It would not be an offense unless the defendant is at least
three years older than the "victim."5
Another important development is the new Journal of California Law Enforcement. The Journal, now in its second
year, is published by the California Peace Officers' Association for its members, and contains articles on such problems
:lS "black power," advising minors of their rights, the rights of
drrested persons in general, some technical articles, as well
as articles designed to improve police administration. Each
issue includes a discussion of recent decisions. One issue
contains a useful summary of 1967 legislation affecting criminallaw. The editors should be complimented for a fine job.
It is hoped that the journal is being distributed to judges,
particularly those in the appellate courts who sometimes seem
unaware of police problems.
I. Criminal Procedure

A. Pretrial Procedures
Arrest, Search and SeizureS
In 1967 the legislature established detailed provisions in
Penal Code section 1538.5 for pretrial hearings to determine
whether questioned items of evidence are a product of an
4. Cal. Penal Code § 269a.
5. The draft does not consider young
males who are victimized by females.

24
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6. For an interesting note see Stop
and Frisk in California, 18 Hastings
L.J. 623 (1967).
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unreasonable search and seizure. The defendant Can move
to return property or suppress evidence. The right to move
for return or suppression at the trial is restricted to cases
where prior opportunity to make the motion did not exist or
where the defendant was unaware of the grounds. The prosecutor can seek review by a writ of mandate or prohibition
if the motion is granted. The defendant may include denial
of his motion as a ground for appeal upon conviction. The
new statute will provide an orderly and efficient procedure
for testing illegality of a search and seizure.
The problem of disclosure of the names of informers in
narcotics cases has been very troublesome. Informers must
be used if the law is to be enforced. If their names are disclosed they may be dead-perhaps physicially or at least
as informers. In 1958, in Priestly v. Superior Court,7 the
California Supreme Court held that if communications
from an informer are relied upon to show reasonable cause
to make an arrest and a search incidental thereto, the identity
of the informer must be disclosed at the defendant's request
or testimony as to his communications must be stricken. In
1965 the legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section
1881.1 8 to allow nondisclosure in narcotics prosecutions if
the magistrate or trial judge is satisfied after a hearing that
the informer is reliable. The court, in a per curiam decision
in Martin v. Superior Court,9 followed McCray v. Illinois 1o
and held that section 1881.1 is constitutional. Perhaps
Martin should be extended to types of criminal activity other
than narcotics arrests.
It has been held that a peace officer's powers to arrest
beyond his territorial jurisdiction are identical with those of
any citizen.ll His powers to search after such an arrest are
also those of a private citizen, namely, to search for offensive
weapons. 12 However, the California Supreme Court recently
7. 50 Cal.2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958).
8. Former Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §
1881.1 is now Cal. Evid. Code § 1042.
9. 66 Cal.2d 257, 57 Cal. Rptr. 351,
424 P.2d 935 (1967).
370
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10. 386 u.s. 300, 18 L. Ed.2d 62, 87
S. Ct. 1056 (1967).
11. People v. Martin, 225 Cal. App.
2d 91, 36 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1964).
12. Cal. Penal Code § 846; see also
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recognized that the doctrine of "fresh pursuit,,13 is not limited
by the historical application of "freshness." Furthermore,
the court seems ready to approve the 1965 amendment to
Penal Code section 817, which seems to be an endeavor to
overrule earlier decisions, and which extends the authority
of a peace officer "to any place in the state . . . as to a
public offense . . . [committed or] which there is probable
cause to believe has been committed within the political subdivision that employs him.,,14
The problem of impounded cars has also been troublesome.
When an arrest is made in or around a motor vehicle under
circumstances that require taking the defendant to the police
station, the peace officers obviously cannot leave the car
on the street; they therefore impound it. This means that
it must be towed, either by their own tow car in a large jurisdiction, or by a contractor. The contents of the car have to
be inventoried, lest questions arise as to whether someone has
stolen some of its contents. Thus, if highway patrol officers
make an arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquors, the defendant must be taken to jail. While awaiting
the tow truck, one officer makes out the "drunk" report, while
the other inventories the contents of the vehicle and tries
to get the defendant to sign the inventory.
Judicial decisions have tended to limit the right to search
impounded vehicles. For example, in Preston v. United
States,15 the defendants were arrested for vagrancy. One officer drove the car to the station and had it towed to a garage.
After the defendants were booked, the glove compartment
and trunk were searched without a search warrant. Articles
were found which were used to convict the defendants on a
charge of conspiracy to rob a bank. The convictions were
reversed on the ground that the search was too remote in
time and place to have been incidental to the arrest.
People v. Martin, 225 Cal. App.2d 91,
36 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1964).
13. People v. Sandoval, 65 Cal.2d
303, 54 Cal. Rptr. 123, 419 P.2d 187
(1966).

14.
Rptr.
15.
84 S.

65 Ca1.2d at 3l3, n. 10, 54 Cal.
at 129, 419 P.2d at 193.
376 U.S. 364, 11 L. Ed.2d 777,
Ct. 881 (1964).
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In People v. Burke/6 the California Supreme Court was
faced with a similar problem. The defendant was arrested
early in the morning on suspicion of burglary, apparently with
reasonable cause. The officers could not open the trunk of
the car with the keys provided, and towed the car to the
impound lot. The car was not searched until 3: 00 p.m. In
the trunk were found articles taken in a burglary shortly
before the arrest, which were later used in evidence. The
court held that the search was too remote in time and place
and the evidence obtained as a result was improperly admitted.
However, in Cooper v. California 17 a result prevailed which
seems to be inconsistent with Preston and Burke. In that
case the United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, upheld a California court. Section 11611 of the Health
and Safety Code provides that any officer making an arrest
for a narcotics violation must seize the vehicle and turn it
over to the Division of Narcotics "to be held as evidence"
until a forfeiture has been declared or a release ordered. In
Cooper the officers had reasonable cause to make the arrest.
They then seized the car. A week later, a search was made
of the impounded car without a warrant, and some of the
fruits of that search were admitted in evidence at Cooper's
trial for selling heroin. The court, quoting United States v.
Rabinowitz/ 8 stated that "[t]he relevant test is not whether
it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the
search was reasonable.,,19 In Cooper the court found a "reasonable" search even though the search had been made a week
after the arrest.
This year the California Supreme Court also decided
People v. Webb. 20 In Webb, the defendant was lawfully
arrested, pursuant to an outstanding warrant, on a summer
night in an Oakland area largely inhabited by Negroes. He
tried to escape and shots were fired which resulted in a collision
16. 61 Cal.2d 575, 39 Cal. Rptr. 531,
394 P.2d 67 (1964).
17. 386 U.S. 58, 17 L. Ed.2d 730,
87 S. Ct. 788 (1967).
18. 339 U.S. 56, 94 L. Ed. 653, 70
S. Ct. 430 (1950).
372
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19. 339 U.S. at 65, 94 L. Ed. at 660,
70 S. Ct. at 435 (1950).
20. 66 Cal.2d 107, 56 Cal. Rptr.
902, 424 P.2d 342 (1967).
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between the defendant's car and a parked car. The defendant
was wounded. In the interval before the arrival of an ambulance, a red balloon was observed on the floor in the front
seat of the car. A crowd gathered and it was decided that
the car should not be further searched at the scene. It was
towed to a police parking lot and searched when the arresting
officer, who had accompanied the defendant to the hospital,
had an opportunity to make the search. Other balloons were
found, all of which contained heroin. (The facts do not show
whether there were more red balloons; at least one was
orange.) Justice Mosk, writing for the majority, upheld the
search. He distinguished Preston and Burke, and swept
Cooper under the rug. However, he wrote what to law professors will be a very useful opinion discussing numerous
decisions. [A number of the Mosk decisions of the past year
are going to find their way into my criminal procedure coursebook. They are sound opinions, whether you agree with
them or not.] Justice Peters concurred, in a brief opinion,
but thought that the search was proper under Cooper and
that Cooper overruled Preston. Although I agree with the
result in Webb, I have some difficulty in understanding why
the California courts should be bound by Cooper even if it
did overrule Preston, as suggested by Justice Peters. Can we
not, under our state Constitution, have more restrictive rules
than those proclaimed by the United States Supreme Court
under the Fourteenth Amendment?
There were several other arrest, search and seizure decisions which are worthy of brief mention. Evidence resulting
from illegal searches and seizures by private persons continues
to be admissible. Thus, in People v. Botts,l a service station
attendant observed narcotics activity through a hole in the
wall of a restroom and reported his observations to peace
officers. This led to arrest and conviction of the defendant
for possession of heroin. The court distinguished cases involving such searches by peace officers2 or their agents,3 and
affirmed the conviction. Its ground seemingly was that a
1. 250 Cal. App.2d 478, 58 Cal. Rptr.
412 (1967).
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2. See, e.g., Bielicki v. Superior
Court, 57 Cal.2d 602, 21 Cal. Rptr.
552, 371 P.2d 288 (1962).
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private citizen cannot be assumed to be aware of the exclusionary rule. It did recognize, however, that "It may well
be that the bathroom is becoming the last sanctuary of privacy
in an increasingly Orwellian society.,,4
It is also legal to search a baby's diaper and seize heroin,
provided, of course, that there is reasonable cause to believe
that a crime is being committed on the premises. 5 Apparently
under such circumstances a baby wearing a diaper is the
equivalent of a house, a garage, or a car. Incidentally, the
baby was not arrested for possession of heroin.
The right of Alcoholic Beverage Control officers to search
a bar without a warrant under applicable statutes6 was upheld
in People v. Lisner.7 The court felt that the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure is less limited in searches
of bars than in searches of "businesses standing higher in the
public esteem"g or dwellings. There was no discussion of
probable cause (receiving stolen property), although it appeared to be present.
In People v. Williams,9 the court upheld a search under
what appears to be a rather novel fact situation. Officers
approached a store at 5: 30 a.m. to investigate a ringing
burglar alarm. At a point a block and a half from the store,
the officers observed the headlights of an approaching automobile. There were no other moving cars on the street. The
officers made a U-turn and followed the suspect vehicle, which
made a number of turns in the course of a few blocks. The
officers then activated the red light and siren and followed
at high speed. The defendant ultimately got out of the car
and fled on foot. The key remained in the ignition. When
the officers reached the auto they opened the trunk and observed a stack of men's suits on hangers. They arrested the

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/16

3. See, e.g., People v. Tarantino, 45
Cal.2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955).
4. 250 Cal. App.2d at 483, 58 Cal.
Rptr. at 416.
5. People v. Garavito, 65 Cal.2d 761,
56 Cal. Rptr. 289, 423 P.2d 217 (1967).
The court found other grounds for reversal by a 4-to-3 decision.
374
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6. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 25753,
25755.
7. 249 Cal. App.2d 637, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 674 (1967).
8. 249 Cal. App.2d at 641, 57 Cal.
Rptr. at 677 (1967).
9. 67 Ca1.2d 167, 60 Cal. Rptr. 472,
430 P.2d 30 (1967).
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defendant in a vacant building a block away, and towed the
car to a police storage garage where its contents were inventoried without a warrant. In addition to 29 suits previously
observed, the trunk contained burglary tools. The court
upheld both searches as incident to the arrest and as analogous to the situation in Webb.
In People v. Hohensee,lo the court considered the surreptitious recording of a public lecture. The defendant held
lectures in a rented hotel conference room. He represented
that Mercurochrome causes cancer, that the white of an egg
cures burns without scarring, that the American Medical
Association is the American Murder Association, and that
Salk and Sabin vaccines cause more polio than they cure,
and represented that his "Elixir of the Gods" (honey) would
eliminate arthritis. The modus operandi was to hold lectures
representing that the "elixir" could cure diseases, to give it
away, and then to collect substantial sums of money as donations from the gullible audience. A food and drug inspector
entered a 10ft above the meeting room with permission of
the hotel, and placed a microphone three feet from the loudspeaker in the ceiling to record the lectures.
Distinguishing Silverman v. United States/ 1 the court held
that placing a microphone three feet from the loudspeaker
was not an unauthorized physical intrusion into a private
area. The officer did not spy on the defendant through holes
bored or other openings made for spying into a private area.
The lectures were public. Therefore hearing what the audience heard was not a search.
In Flack v. Municipal Court,12 there was a seizure of an
allegedly lewd film without a warrant. Petitioner Flack was
the owner of a theatre showing the film "Sexus," which had
been showing for two weeks. Local officers viewed the film
and believed it to be obscene. They arrested petitioner and
at the same time seized the film. The court noted that the
10. 251 Cal. App.2d 193, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 234 (1967).
11. 365 U.S. 505, 5 L. Ed.2d 734,
81 S. Ct. 679. 97 A.L.R.2d 1277 (1961).

12. 66 Cal.2d 981, 59 Cal. Rptr.
872, 429 P.2d 192 (1967).

CAL LAW 1967
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film had been showing for two weeks and, even if the search
had been contemporaneous with the arrest, a search warrant
should have been secured prior to any search or seizure of the
material. It distinguished this set of facts from the situation
where there is a high probability of the evidence being lost,
destroyed, or spirited away. The court issued a writ of mandate compelling the return of the film. Justice McComb
dissented. 13
In People v. Mills,14 a search warrant was properly sought.
In issuing the warrant, the magistrate used a mimeographed
form which adopts for Los Angeles County the form of warrant prescribed by Penal Code section 1529. This form
commands that the search be made "in the daytime (at any
time of the day or night, good cause being shown therefor)."
The court felt that, pursuant to Penal Code section 1533, the
failure of the magistrate to strike out the phrase "in the daytime" invalidated a nighttime search. It appears that Penal
Code section 1533 expressly requires an affirmative act on
the part of the magistrate if night search is to be authorized. 15
In a shocking decision, the California Supreme Court
reversed a death penalty following a conviction in a brutal
murder case, in People v. Spencer. 16 The defendant made
an extrajudicial confession uncoerced by pre-Escobedo standards. He confirmed his confession at trial, but claimed that
the killing was unintentional. Since it was a robbery-murder,
this was, of course, irrelevant. His codefendant testified
that the defendant had told him of his intention to kill. The
surviving witness testified to the facts. The court applied the
13. In his dissent, Justice McComb
incorporated by reference the lower
court opinion in 56 Cal. Rptr. 162
(1967), which seems to make more
sense. There is nothing in the facts
to suggest that this was more than a
seizure incident to a search without a
warrant, or that the officers had time
to obtain a warrant.
14. 251 Cal. App. 2d 420, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 489 (1967).
376
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15. Cal. Penal Code § 1533. Insertion of direction to serve warrant at
any time of day or night.
On a showing of good cause therefor,
the magistrate may, in his discretion,
insert a direction in the warrant that it
may be served at any time of the day
or night; in the absence of such a
direction, the warrant may be served
only in the daytime.
16. 66 Ca1.2d 158, 57 Cal. Rptr. 163,
424 P.2d 715 (1967).
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principles established by Escobedo v. Illinois l7 and People v.
Dorado,I8 to conclude that the trial court had committed
reversible error in admitting the defendant's confession in
evidence. The court stated:
Under the circumstances . . . we cannot realistically
ignore the possibility that defendant's extrajudicial confession might have impelled his subsequent confession
in court. . . . In this sense, a later confession may
always be viewed in part as fruit of the first.l9
The court felt that its rule of reversible error per se compelled
reversal of the conviction. Since the trial was pre-Escobedo,
the defendant could not have known that the confession
should have been excluded. Had he known this, he might
have taken the stand to explain it or emphasize extenuating
circumstances. The pre-Escobedo defendant must be given
all the advantages of Escobedo.
What is custody under Escobedo and Miranda?20 Early
in 1963, the court stated that "Arrest is not essential to the
maturing of the accusatory stage." In People v. Kelley,l
Kelley, a serviceman, was interrogated by an officer of the
San Diego Police Department at the San Diego Naval Station
regarding his wife's allegation that he had sexually molested
his eight-year-old step-son, in violation of sections 288 and
288a of the California Penal Code. The police officer had
informed Kelley of his rights, including his right to counsel.
At the conclusion of this interrogation, Kelley was told to
"hang around." Kelley was later interrogated by an employee
of the San Diego Naval Station. He was again informed of
his rights, except that nothing was said of his right to counsel.
The poor Navy investigator should have known about Escobedo (which was not to be decided until six months after
the interview). At a pretrial hearing the Navy investigator
17. 378 U.s. 478, 12 L. Ed.2d 977,
84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964).
18. 62 Cal.2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169,
398 P.2d 361 (1965).
19. 66 Cal.2d at 167, 57 Cal. Rptr.
at 170, 424 P.2d at 722 (1967).

20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 16 L. Ed.2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602,
10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966).
1. 66 Ca1.2d 232, 57 Cal. Rptr. 363,
424 P.2d 947 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967
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testified that Kelley had been free to leave, although he had
not informed him that he was free to leave. Justice Peters,
writing for the majority, declared:
The existence of custody as an element of the accusatory
stage does not depend on the subjective intent of the
interrogator . . . [Rather it depends] upon whether
defendant is placed in a situation in which he reasonably
believes that his freedom of movement is restricted by
pressures of official authority. 2
The court has for some time used the vague expression "custody" rather than "arrest." This court stated: "The rule is
that a confession is inadmissible when at the time it is obtained
. . . the suspect is in custody."a Peace officers have been
puzzled about the difference between arrest and custody. Now
they know. Or do they?
Again, in People v. Arnold/ the court held that custody
occurs when the "suspect is physically deprived of his freedom
. . . in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived."5 The defendant was
notified by a deputy district attorney to come to his office to
discuss the death of her child. Because of her religious beliefs,
the defendant had not obtained medical assistance for her
daughter during the child's terminal illness. Instead, members of defendant's church had immersed the child in the
river several hours before her death. The autopsy showed
a wad of human hair, 2-1/2 inches long, jammed into the
small intestine as the cause of death, with another larger hair
ball lodged in the stomach for a period of several months.
The doctor who performed the autopsy testified that such
obstructions would cause fever, pain, weakness, vomiting and
other indications of serious illness, and that an operation
performed up to twelve hours before the daughter's death
probably would have saved her life.
2. 66 Cal.2d at 246, 57 Cal. Rptr.
at 375, 424 P.2d at 959 (1967).
3. 66 Cal.2d at 245, 57 Cal. Rptr.
at 374, 424 P.2d at 958 (1967).
378
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4. 66 Cal.2d 438, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115,
426 P.2d 515 (1967).
5. 66 Cal.2d at 448, 58 Cal. Rptr.
at 121, 426 P.2d at 521 (1967).
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The defendant testified that she did not know that she
did not have to comply with the district attorney's request
to visit his office. She made a damaging statement which was
admitted into evidence. The court, relying upon Kelley,
reversed, holding that this was "custody"; the accusatory stage
had been reached. Therefore the defendant was entitled to
advice of her rights under Escobedo and Dorado. She reasonably could have believed that she could not leave the interrogation chamber. Again the court spoke of "custody" by
a circularity of definition. Three justices dissented in an
opinion by Justice Mosk. He felt that the defendant had not
been in custody; she had come by invitation. The deputy
district attorney had made it clear that he was only investigating. Indeed, interviews of this type are a familiar and
reasonable aspect of preliminary law enforcement investigations into unusual occurrences and have no such sinister
significance as the majority attribute to them. The defendant
could have left at any time, and did leave after the interview
without being arrested. She was not charged with the crime
until forty days after the interview. The minority would have
rejected the subjective test for determining whether defendant
had been in custody, stating that such a subjective concept
excluded statements not because she had been in custody
but because she later testified she had thought she was in custody. Approval of this mere declaration of her thought
process is a giant departure from all accepted concepts of
police restraint. Although the minority takes the preferable
approach, the decision should caution busy young deputy
district attorneys who perhaps sometimes abruptly summon
possible suspects for interviews. They should make it quite
clear that compliance with such summons is voluntary. And
what of the citation procedures used by many district attorneys?6 Such hearings undoubtedly serve a useful purpose.
However, they should be carefully hedged with procedural
safeguards. Some of the forms now in use could certainly
cause some persons to think that compliance is compulsory.
6. See Hederman and Dahlinger,
Citation Hearing System, 12 HASTINGS
L.J.275 (1961).
CAL LAW 1967
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Chief Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, delivered
a surprising decision in People v. Varnum, 7 upholding the
right of the police to interrogate a suspect without warning
him of his constitutional rights as long as no physical or
psychological coercion is used and the testimony is not used
in court against the defendant interrogated, even if the evidence elicited by such interrogation is used against a codefendant. The alleged murder weapon, a gun, was introduced at
the trial as a most important piece of evidence for the prosecution. The gun had been discovered by the police as a
direct result of the improper interrogation of a codefendant.
The majority opinion frankly admitted that the interrogation
of the codefendant was at the accusatory stage, but reasoned
that the defendant, Varnum, had no standing to object. The
court stated that:
Non-coercive questioning is not in itself unlawful, however, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights protected by Escobedo, Dorado, and Miranda are violated
only when evidence obtained without the required warnings and waiver is introduced against the person whose
questioning produced the evidence.
Accordingly, in the absence of such coercive tactics, there is
no basis for excluding physical or other nonhearsay
evidence acquired as a result of questioning a suspect
in disregard of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
when such evidence is offered at the trial of another
person. s
The court did not use the term "fruits of the poisonous tree,"
or discuss People v. Ditson,9 where it assumed that the fruits
of a codefendant's confession could not be used against the
other defendant.
Justice Peters wrote a strong dissent emphasizing the crystalclear mandate of Escobedo and Miranda, making it unlawful
7. 66 Cal.2d 808, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108,
427 P.2d 772 (1967).
8. 66 Cal. 2d at 812-813, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 111-112, 427 P.2d at 775
(1967).
380
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369 P.2d 714 (1962); vacated, 371 U.S.
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to interrogate without giving the required warnings. "Insofar
as we permit the fruits of an interrogation in violation of
those cases to be introduced into evidence we are encouraging
not deterring unlawful police activity.mo
People v. Gonzalesll also involved the admissibility of a
codefendant's extrajudicial statements, but is distinguished
from Varnum inasmuch as the extrajudicial statements in
Gonzales were used in a joint trial. The California Supreme
Court reversed, basing its decision on People v. Aranda/ 2
even though the trial judge carefully instructed the jury as to
the limited effect of the statements. The court, relying on
People v. Charles/ 3 applied Aranda retroactively. The
Aranda rule is available to defendants whose judgments of
conviction are still on appeal, even though they were tried
before the date of the Aranda decision, November 12, 1965.
In People v. Hines,14 the court, for a change, reached a
realistic result on a confession problem. This case involved
a "walk-in" confession of a robbery-murder, in which the
defendant had walked into the Venice police substation, surrendered the murder gun and ammunition, and confessed to
the police. He was questioned for 55 minutes, with the
conversation being tape recorded. However, the court felt
that the questioning was necessary, since there was a possibility that he was mentally disturbed or a fraud, reminiscent
of the "Black Dahlia" case where the "walk-in" confessions
ran to several hundred. Justice Peters dissented at some
length, reasoning that at some point during the 55-minute
period of questioning the stage ceases to be "investigatory"
and becomes "accusatory."
Right to Counser s
There were a number of important right-to-counsel decisions. Perhaps the most important was People v. Car10. 66 Cal.2d at 819, 59 Cal. Rptr.
at 115-116,427 P.2d at 779-780 (1967).
11. 66 Cal.2d 482, 58 Cal. Rptr.
361, 426 P.2d 929 (1967).
12. 63 Cal.2d 518, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353,
407 P.2d 265 (1965), discussed infra
under Retroactivity.

13. 66 Cal.2d 330, 57 Cal. Rptr. 745,
425 P.2d 545 (1967).
14. 66 Cal.2d 348, 57 Cal. Rptr.
757, 425 P.2d 557 (1967).
15. See an interesting article, Graham,
What is Custodial Interrogation?: Califomia's Anticipatory Application of
CAL LAW 1967
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ter.16 Can a defendant conditionally waive his right to counsel
and, when his condition is refused, obtain a reversal? The
California Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative. The defendant's condition was use of the law library.
The court felt that, at least under the facts shown, a defendant who wishes to represent himself should be allowed as a
minimum to avail himself of the legal materials available
where he is confined. It noted that, in many cases, the
minimum may be insufficient. Hopefully, the court will not
create a constitutional right to visit the law library. Letting
prisoners use the law library poses serious escape problems.
It is expensive to provide guards. The right to counsel may
include some right of a prisoner to use some of the facilities
of the law library-in his cell. It should not include the right
to go to the library. If a prisoner wants to do that he should
be permitted to do it-through his counsel.
Penal Code section 3042 provides that at least thirty days
before a meeting to consider a granting of a parole, the Adult
Authority shall send written notice to the Director of Corrections, to the person requesting parole, and to the attorney for
that person. But this requirement is held to be a general
notice statute which does not evince an intent of the legislature
to require the appointment of counsel at public expense for
all indigent prisoners scheduled for parole consideration. The
California Supreme Court, in In re Schoengarth,17 denied that
a prisoner seeking a parole and the fixing of his indeterminate
sentence has a right to counsel. This, it said, is an administrative proceeding, and there is no right to counsel in such a
proceeding.
In re Smiley18 points to the importance of carefully maintaining an adequate docket showing advice of right to coun-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/16

Miranda v. Arizona, 14 UCLAL.Rev.
59 (1966).
16. 66 Cal.2d 666, 58 Cal. Rptr.
614, 427 P.2d 214 (1967).
17. 66 Cal.2d 295, 57 Cal. Rptr.
600, 425 P.2d 200 (1967). See also
In re Allison, 66 Cal.2d 282, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 593, 425 P.2d 193 (1967) con382
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cerning the problem of adequate communication by a prisoner with his
counsel and use of law books by a
prisoner. These two decisions by Justice Mosk contain very useful discussions of the problems involved.
18. 66 Ca1.2d 606, 58 Cal. Rptr.
579, 427 P.2d 179 (1967).
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sel, even in misdemeanor cases. It is not enough to show
that the defendant was "duly arraigned." The clerk must
go through the rigmarole of showing advice as to right to
counsel, the right to court~appointed counsel if defendant is
indigent, and the fact that there was a knowing and intelligently expressed waiver. The docket entries must be prepared for the particular case before the court; that requirement will not be satisfied by the use of forms. This decision
points for the need of removing many types of offenses from
the misdemeanor category and denominating them civil offenses or violations. Hopefully, the right to counsel as well
as the right to trial by jury could be removed in such instances.
The right to be informed of the right to assistance of counsel
under Escobedo is not unlimited. Thus, in People v. Arguello/9 the defendant, in a gruesome murder, used a hammer
which he tied to his 82-year-old victim's neck by a cord, using
an unusual knot. A district attorney's investigator requested
an officer at the jail to have defendant tie a bunch of clothing.
In doing so defendant used the same type of knot as was used
to tie the hammer to the victim's neck. Evidence of this was
used at the trial. The jail officer had failed to inform defendant of his right to an attorney and to remain silent before
letting him tie the knot. The court rejected defendant's contention that his rights had been violated, reasoning that deception alone does not render incriminating statements inadmissible if it was not of a type reasonably likely to procure an
untrue statement. Similarly, the deception employed in getting the defendant to tie the knot did not render the evidence
inadmissible. The moral of the story is that usually, but not
always, the inhabitants of death row can tie the court in knots.
Seemingly, a confession made to a nurse is admissible even
without a warning as to constitutional rights, at least if "made
voluntarily, without any questioning.
. no police officers [being] present."20 Small wonder that the public loses
its respect for the courts when something so obvious has to
19. 65 Cal.2d 768, 56 Cal. Rptr.
274, 423 P.2d 202 (1967).
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870, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 638, 423 P.2d at
790 (1967).
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be expressed in a judicial decision. Perhaps the result would
have been different had the events taken place in a county
hospital.
Apparently, admissions blurted out when the suspect is
surprised while sitting on a toilet are admissible, despite lack
of Miranda warnings. It was so held in People v. TahP
In People v. Lara,2 it was contended that the Dorado warnings are insufficient in a case involving minors, and that the
waiver must be consented to either by an attorney or a parent.
The court, over vigorous dissent by Justice Peters, rejected
this contention, stating that whether a minor knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights is a question of fact. The court
said, "mere failure of the authorities to seek the additional
consent of an adult cannot be held to outweigh, in any given
instance, an evidentially-supported finding that such a waiver
was actually made."s

Bair
Failure to make much use of "own-recognizance releases"
continues in some jurisdictions. Many inferior courts fail
to use the procedure at all in Vehicle Code and other minor
misdemeanor cases, despite a clear direction that they have
. discretion to do SO.5 Similarly, use of own-recognizance
releases in felony cases varies from county to county. Yet
the various bail studies6 demonstrate that the use of this
procedure has been successful with remarkably few exceptions. Failure to appear on a felony own-recognizance release
is itself a felony, and on a misdemeanor release a misdemeanor. 7 I might add that these offenses should be very
easy to prove. The California Supreme Court in In re
Smiley 8 nudged the courts in a mild way to make greater use
1. 65 Cal.2d 719, 56 Cal. Rptr. 318,
423 P.2d 246 (1967).
2. 67 Cal.2d 367, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586,
432 P.2d 202 (1967).
3. 67 Cal.2d at 381, 62 Cal. Rptr. at
596,432 P.2d at 212.
. 4. See Note, An Alternative to the
Bail System, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 643
(1966).
384
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5. Cal. Penal Code § 1318.
6. See citations in In re Smiley, 66
CaI.2d 606 at n. 3, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579,
427 P.2d 179 (1967).
7. Cal. Penal Code §§ 1319.4, 1319.6.
8. 66 Cal. 2d 606, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579,
427 P.2d 179 (1967).
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of the own-recognizance release. Consider the problems of
crowded and ancient jails, welfare costs for the families of
those who cannot raise bail, loss of employment, and even
equal protection of the laws. Perhaps it is time for more
than a mild nudge. Doubtless the bail bond brokers' lobby
will disagree.
Preliminary Hearing
The presenting of defenses in preliminary hearings is a
troublesome problem. Anyone who has watched Perry Mason
is aware of this. Perry seems invariably to win his case at
the preliminary hearing. Or did he lose one once? Yet it
is clear from Penal Code section 866 9 that the defendant has
a right to put on witnesses.
Jennings v. Superior C ourtlO is practically a text on preliminary hearings. In that case the defendant wanted to prove
a defense of entrapment. He was unable to subpoena a key
witness in his alleged defense and asked for a continuance.
The magistrate concluded that the only issue was probable
cause to hold the accused to answer, denied a continuance,
and held the defendant to answer a charge of possession of
narcotics. A motion under Penal Code section 995,11 on
the ground of illegal commitment, was denied by the Superior
Court. For this and other errors the court issued a writ of
prohibition to prevent the trial, stating that the right of a
defendant to reasonably prepare for trial is as fundamental
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9. Cal. Penal Code § 866. Examination of defendant's witnesses.
When the examination of witnesses
on the part of the people is closed, any
witnesses the defendant may produce
must be sworn and examined.
10. 66 Cal.2d 867, 59 Cal. Rptr.
440, 428 P.2d 304 (1967).
11. Cal. Penal Code § 995. When
indictment or information must be set
aside.
The indictment or information must
be set aside by the court in which the
defendant is arraigned, upon his motion,
in either of the following cases:
25

If it be an indictment:
1. Where it is not found, endorsed,

and presented as prescribed in this code.
2. That the defendant has been indicted without reasonable or probable
cause.
If it be an information:
1. That before the filing thereof the
defendant had not been legally committed by a magistrate.
2. That the defendant had been committed without reasonable or probable
cause.
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as the right to counsel, and the absence of a material witness
for the defense, under appropriate conditions, is a ground for
continuance. Justice McComb dissented without opinion.
Ordinarily an attorney for a defendant will not want to put
on his case at the preliminary hearing. However, he may want
to pin down prosecution witnesses by cross-examination. He
may even want to call some obviously prospective prosecution
witnesses for discovery purposes. He will seldom call his own
witnesses. Jennings should be no great burden on the courts
-as long as we can keep out Perry Mason.
Speedy Trial

The legislature as well as the courts have had a great deal
of trouble with the problem of the right to speedy trial in
misdemeanor cases. At present, section 1382 of the Penal
Code provides that the defendant must be brought to trial
within thirty days after the arraignment if he is in custody, or
within forty-five days after his arraignment if he is not. If
he has no counsel, the court is supposed to explain his rights
under this section. The section is very unfair. If an arrest
is made for a misdemeanor not in the presence of the peace
officer, a complaint is filed and a warrant issued. The busy
sheriff's office may not get around to serving the warrant for
months. The defendant may not even know that the peace
officer intended to file a complaint. In fact, the peace officer
probably did not know this until after he discussed the matter
with his superiors. Section 1382 thus permits the trial of
very stale misdemeanors. The case of In re Smiley12 provides
a great deal of useful background on the problem. It also
points to the importance of carefully advising the unrepresented defendant of his rights under that section and making
clear docket entries showing the details of the advice given.
B. Retroactivity
One of the most important developments in criminal procedure is limitation on the retroactive effect of recent changes

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/16

12. 66 Cal.2d 606, 58 Cal. Rptr, 579,
427 P,2d 179 (1967),
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in criminal procedure. The California Supreme Court wants
to increase the rights of criminals, though there is at the
same time some awareness of the problems of retroactivity.
Twenty years ago, John Hood held up a Mom-and-Pop liquor
store. He shot Pop in cold blood. Mom was the only eyewitness. Now Mom is dead. Unfortunately, Hood was not
accorded his then nonexistent due process rights. He was not
informed of his then nonexistent right to remain silent and to
counsel, including a right to counsel during any interrogation
and while he was in a police lineup. He confessed. Under
today's standards his confession would be inadmissible. If
on habeas corpus we gave him a new trial, he would go free.
We-or some of us-would hate to see John Hood go free,
whether or not we agree with the new rules. Giving Supreme
Court decisions prospective effect only is one way out. Once
we turn to such a doctrine, the problem becomes to determine
the date beyond which there will be no retroactivity. Should
it be the date of the decision? Should it apply only to crimes
which take place after the decision? What of pending appeals? What of trials which have not yet taken place?
One of the games the California Supreme Court plays is
called "anticipating the United States Supreme Court." If
we can beat that Court to some new extension of the Fourteenth Amendment, we, rather than they, become the leaders.
In Escobedo and Dorado, the United States Supreme Court
and the California Supreme Court, respectively, developed
new rules for questioning suspects. This was done under the
guise of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the case of In re
Lopez,13 the California court delivered one of its anticipatory
decisions. It held that Escobedo and Dorado would apply
only to judgments of conviction not final before June 22,
1964, the date of Escobedo. In other words, Escobedo and
Dorado would apply retroactively only to decisions still in
the courts as of that date-cases which had not been tried or
which were pending on appeal. They would not be applied to
collateral attacks such as habeas corpus proceedings. This,
13. 62 Cal.2d 368, 42 Cal. Rptr.
188, 398 P.2d 380 (1965).
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of course, was a rather strange way to give a decision "prospective effect." But as Alice said: "[H]ow curiously it
twists! It's more like a corkscrew than a path!"
The United States Supreme Court proceeded to disturb
this result in Johnson v. New Jersey.14 The Court held that
application of Escobedo and Miranda would be required only
where the trial took place after the respective dates of those
decisions. In a way, this is just as strange a doctrine of retroactivity as that of California in Lopez. Logically, if we are
going to apply such a doctrine, the key date should be the
date of the event to which the new interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment is to be applied. Thus, logically,
Escobedo should apply only to confessions which are procured
after the date of that decision. In fact, logically, it should not
even apply to Danny Escobedo's confession, although perhaps
we can be kind and give Danny a break, since he was the
guinea pig who started it all.
So the California court found itself in a dilemma when
faced with People v. Rollins/5 probably its most important
decision of the year. Should it blushingly admit that it made
a mistake in Lopez? Should it apply the Lopez rule to
Miranda? Or should it take some compromise position, such
as retaining Lopez for Escobedo and Dorado, and follow
Johnson in Miranda-type decisions? The court chose to take
the last-mentioned position. In a rather unconvincing opinion, the court followed Johnson in limiting Miranda to trials
which began after the date of that decision (June 13, 1966),
but will continue to follow Lopez and apply Escobedo and
Dorado to all cases not final before June 22, 1964, the date of
Escobedo. What was it that Mr. Bumble said? "If the law
supposes that . . . the law is a ass, a idiot."
Justice Peters correctly pointed out that whatever rule
California is to follow, it should be the same both with
Escobedo and with Miranda. However, he preferred the
Lopez rule.
14. 384 u.s. 719, 16 L. Ed.2d 882,
86 S. Ct. 1772 (1966).
388

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/16

15. 65 Ca1.2d 681, 56 Cal. Rptr.
293,423 P.2d 221 (1967).

CAL LAW 1967

22

Collings: Criminal Law

Criminal Law and Procedure

There were other important retroactivity decisions. In
People v. lackson/ 6 the defendant testified at his pre-Escobedo
penalty trial. Portions of the evidence, including seriously
damaging statements which were admitted during his trial
on the issue of guilt and during his first penalty trial, were
admitted in evidence at his second penalty trial. The court
held that Escobedo was applicable to the second penalty trial,
which occurred after the magic date, June 22, 1964. Justice
Peters dissented to a portion of the opinion which refused to
apply Escobedo to the pre-Escobedo trial on issue of guilt.
Justice McComb would have affirmed the death penalty.
Douglas v. California 17 created a right to counsel on appeal
for indigent defendants. This right has been applied retroactively to cases prior to Douglas. In cases where appointment of counsel was denied, the appeal is reinstated and
counsel appointed. However, the court in People v. Rivers 18
determined that Escobedo and Dorado would only apply to
cases pending on direct appeal at the time of the Escobedo
decision. Douglas created a retroactive right to counsel on
appeal. But counsel appointed pursuant to Douglas could
not raise an Escobedo problem. The court in Rivers stated:
To apply Escobedo at a reinstated appeal and to review
police conduct that occurred years before that decision
would not promote equality. To the contrary, "the indigent defendant deprived of counsel anomalously would
find himself possessed of more shafts in his quiver than
would have been the case had he been able to afford
to properly arm himself in the first instance."19
People v. Aranda20 established the notion that under most
circumstances a defendant is entitled to a separate trial when
his codefendant's confession is to be used at the trial. In
16. 67 Cal.2d 91, 60 Cal. Rptr. 248,
429 P.2d 600 (1967). For another outrageous application of the retroactivity
doctrine in the Escobedo situation, see
People v. Powell., 67 Cal.2d 25, 59
Cal. Rptr. 817, 429 P.2d 137 (1967).

18. 66 Cal.2d 1000, 59 Cal. Rptr.
851, 429 P.2d 171 (1967).
19. 66 Cal. 2d at 1004, 59 Cal. Rptr.
at 854, 429 P.2d at 174 (1967).
20. 63 Cal.2d 518, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353,
407 P.2d 265 (1965).

17. 372 U.S. 353, 9 L. Ed.2d 811,
83 S. Ct. 814 (1963).
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People v. Charles/ the California Supreme Court decided that
the Aranda rule would be retroactive except as to cases where
the attack was collateral. In other words, Aranda governs
as to all cases still pending on direct review. This is so despite
the fact that the court feels that Aranda is not constitutionally
impelled but merely procedural. The court stubbornly ignores
the more appropriate rule laid down in the Johnson decision.
Justices Mosk, Burke, and McComb felt that Aranda should
not govern cases tried before the decision was rendered in
that case. Justice Mosk felt that Aranda was a rule of practice. Such a rule, if adopted by the legislature, would govern
from the date it took effect. Why should there be a difference
in a judicially created rule of practice? To apply it to cases
prior to the decision, he said, "makes rare prescience a requisite in prosecutors and trial judges."2 One of the most amazing things about Charles is that the court applied Aranda
although the case was tried before a trial judge without a
jury on the transcript of the preliminary hearing. Each defendant confessed. Whatever the Aranda rule may be, it
surely should not be applied in such circumstances. This is,
to say the least, "anomalous," as is stated in the opinion of
Justice Burke. I could use stronger language but will resist
in this case, since I have plenty of support from the minority.
C. Trial

Present Insanity
In Pate v. Robinson,S the United States Supreme Court
held that where there is substantial evidence that a defendant
is insane at the time of trial, there is a constitutional right
to a hearing on that issue regardless of defendant's failure
to demand a sanity hearing. The court's failure to make
such an inquiry on its own motion is ground for reversal.
The court stated, "[I]t is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently
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1. 66 Cal.2d 330, 57 Cal. Rptr. 745,
425 P.2d 545 (1967).
2. 66 Cal. 2d at 345, 57 Cal. Rptr.
at 755,425 P.2d at 555 (1967).
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'waive' his right to have the court determine his capacity to
stand trial. "4
What is "substantial evidence"? The California Supreme
Court, in People v. Pennington,5 thought that the testimony
of one psychologist who was neither an M.D. nor a Ph.D.
sufficed to constitute substantial evidence. Although the
psychologist had treated the defendant in the past, his testimony was based on brief courtroom observations and a
fifteen-minute interview. The trial judge had before him the
reports of four psychiatrists, as well as his own observations
of the defendant's actions in the courtroom. Two Justices
dissented in an opinion by Justice Mosk. He pointed out the
dissimilarity of Pate, since there the testimony of four witnesses for the defense was uncontradicted. Shades of Mr.
Bumble!
People v. Laudermilk 6 is inconsistent with Pennington.
The defendant's own statements concerning psychiatric examinations in two Colorado hospitals, plus his attorney's
statement to the effect that in his opinion defendant was
incapable of assisting in his defense, were considered to be
insufficient to require a hearing under Penal Code section
1368. 7 The psychiatric reports were apparently available
to the four psychiatrists who examined defendant and were
of the opinion he was competent to stand trial. Justice
Peters vigorously dissented. Of course, Pennington was a
capital case and Laudermilk was not. Perhaps this explains
the rather obvious inconsistency between the two decisions.
4. 383 U.S. at 384, 15 L. Ed.2d at
821, 86 S. Ct. at 841 (1966).
5. 66 Cal.2d 508, 58 Cal. Rptr. 374,
426 P.2d 942 (1967).
6. 67 Cal.2d 269, 61 Cal. Rptr. 644,
431 P.2d 228 (1967).
7. Cal. Penal Code § 1368. Question of sauity to be submitted when
doubt arises prior to judgmeut: Suspension of proceedings: Discharge or
retention of trial jury.
If at any time during the pendency
of an action and prior to judgment a
doubt arises as to the sanity of the
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defendant, the court must order the
question as to his sanity to be determined by a trial by the court without
a jury, or with a jury, if a trial by
jury is demanded; and, from the time
of such order, all proceedings in the
criminal prosecution shall be suspended
until the question of the sanity of the
defendant has been determined, and
the trial jury in the criminal prosecution may be discharged, or retained,
according to the discretion of the court
until the determination of the issue of
insanity.
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In People v. Ray,S the defendant in a murder case (a life
sentence for first-degree murder of his daughter) tried to avoid
the application of Penal Code section 1074, subdivision 8.
That subdivision, as interpreted in the decision, allows a challenge for implied bias in death penalty cases where a prospective juror does not believe in the death penalty. The defendant's rather interesting contention was to the effect that such
challenges should not be allowed as to the trial jury, but only
to the penalty jury. In other words, he should be allowed two
juries. One jury would try the issue of guilt and degree, and
this jury could properly include jurors who oppose the death
penalty. The other jury would try the issue of sentence, and
jurors who opposed the death penalty could be challenged.
The defendant presented the "evidence" of two psychologists
to the effect that jurors who do not oppose the death sentence
are more apt to convict than jurors who do. The evidence
consisted of opinions based on general knowledge and experience without any research basis. The court rejected the
defendant's contention.
How does a borderline psychopath waive a jury trial?
Apparently his lawyer cannot waive it for him. If he is
really insane, he cannot intelligently waive his rights. The
United States Supreme Court, in Lynch v. Overholser,9 established the defendant's right, at least in the District of Columbia, not to have the trial court or the prosecutor raise the
insanity issue. This question was raised in People v. Lookadoo. 10 The court held that on the facts the defendant was
competent to waive a jury trial. Suppose he was not? Lynch
seems to leave this question open. Article I, section 7 of the
California Constitution requires that a jury trial cannot be
waived in criminal cases unless both defendant and his counsel
concur. This provision has been very strictly construed. l l In
8. 252 Cal. App.2d, 1002, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1967).
9. 369 U.S. 705, 8 L. Ed.2d 211, 82
S. Ct. 1063 (1962).
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People v. Hill,12 some doubt having arisen as to the defendant's sanity at the time of trial, experts were appointed and
a hearing held, after which he was found presently sane within
the meaning of Penal Code section 1368. Apparently he
was not informed of his right to a jury trial, either by court
or by counsel. He claimed he had been denied his rights
under Article I, section 7 of the state constitution. The court
held that section 1368 requires a "special proceeding" collateral to the criminal trial and that Article I, section 7 is
inapplicable to such proceedings. The only right to a jury
trial in such cases is that imposed by statute. The defendant
was represented by counsel and there was no duty on the
court to inform him of the right.
Argument and Instruction
In GrifJiin v. California/ 3 the Supreme Court of the United
States overturned California's long-standing and earlier approved14 constitutional provision permitting comment on the
failure of a defendant to testify. GrifJin was decided in 1965
and, as might be expected, there were California decisions
construing that decision this past year.
In People v. Sudduth/ 5 the defendant was convicted of misdemeanor drunk driving. On his arrest he refused to take
any of the physical tests, such as walking a straight line. He
refused a Breathalyzer test. His refusal to take the tests was
commented on by the prosecutor and the jury was instructed
upon the significance of such refusal. The conviction was
upheld in a unanimous opinion over self-incrimination contentions. The court relied upon Schmerber v. California 16
and pointed to the need for fair and efficient detection and
enforcement of the drunk driving laws in a day of excessive
loss of life and property caused by inebriated drivers.
12. 67 Cal.2d 100, 60 Cal. Rptr. 234,
429 P.2d 586 (1967).

IS. 65 Cal.2d 543, 55 Cal. Rptr.
393, 421 P.2d 401 (1966).

13. 380 U.S. 609, 14 L. Ed.2d 106,
85 S. Ct. 1229 (1965).
14. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46,91 L. Ed. 1903,67 S. Ct. 1672, 171
A.L.R. 1223 (1947).

16. 384 U.S. 757, 16 L. Ed.2d 908,
86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966).
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In People v. Ellis/ 7 the defendant was charged with assault
with intent to commit rape. He was asked by the police to
repeat certain phrases to assist the victim in identifying him.
The court, in a much less satisfactory and inconsistent opinion
than Sudduth,18 held, over two dissents, that the prosecution's
comment on defendant's failure to repeat the phrases was
a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. The
court stated that, after giving the usual Fifth Amendment
warning, "[DJefendant's refusal to speak might well have been
the direct result of the police warning and cannot be used
against him."19 Pity the poor peace officer. He is damned if
he warns and damned if he doesn't. The opinion did suggest,
however, that as a prerequisite to the use of the defendant's
refusal to participate in a voice identification, the police must
advise him that the right to remain silent does not include
the right to refuse to participate in such a test.
In People v. Ing,20 there was comment by the prosecutor
and instructions by the trial judge after the defendant charged
with rape took the witness stand but failed to testify concerning other evidence of similar rapes, introduced to show a
common scheme and design. Defendant's modus operandi
was to drug girls who came to him for abortions and thereafter have sexual intercourse with them. The California Supreme Court distinguished Griffin. 1 Here the defendant had
testified. Considering the broad scope of permissible crossexamination of a defendant who chooses to testify on his
own behalf, the examination was proper. By taking the
stand he waived any constitutional privilege against selfincrimination with respect to the collateral offenses.
Another application of Griffin occurred in People v. ROSS.2
There, after an armed robbery and attempted murder with
17. 65 Cal.2d 529, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385,
421 P.2d 393 (1966).
18. People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal.2d
543, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393, 421 P.2d 401
(1966).
19. People v. Ellis, 65 Cal.2d at
539, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 390, 421 P.2d
at 398 (1966).
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20. 65 Cal.2d 603, 55 Cal. Rptr. 902,
422 P.2d 590 (1967).
1. 380 U.S. 609, 14 L. Ed.2d 106,
85 S. Ct. 1229 (1965).
2. 67 Cal.2d 58, 60 Cal. Rptr. 254,
429 P.2d 606 (1967).
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a shotgun with tape around it, the police were given a description of the escape vehicle and the robber. They attempted
to stop a car answering the description. The driver immediately accelerated. Shots were fired at the car and returned.
The driver was ultimately apprehended after flight on foot.
A sawed-off shotgun with white tape on the barrel was found
100 feet from the car. The prosecutor commented and the
court instructed on the failure of the accused to testify. The
court thought that the statements were inconsequential under
the facts. Chief Justice Traynor and Justice Peters dissented.
In Garrity v. New Jersey,3 the United States Supreme Court
was faced with the problem of whether incriminating statements made by a government employee could be used against
him in a criminal prosecution based on those statements.
The court held that they could not be so used. The choice
given him was either to forfeit his job or to pay the penalty
of self-incrimination. One might ask why not, especially
under the facts of the case. The defendants were police
officers who allegedly were fixing traffic tickets. They were
warned of their rights, but also told that they would be subject
to removal if they refused to answer. This was another of
the familiar five-to-four decisions.
In People v. Genser,4 a California court of appeal was faced
with a related problem. The defendant was charged with
perjury for making false statements under oath in the course
of an investigation of Department of Motor Vehicles personnel. The court of appeal showed good judgment in distinguishing Garrity and affirming the conviction. It felt that
Garrity did not furnish a license to commit perjury.
Death Penalty Trial

The court continues to narrow in on death penalty cases.
If one carefully scans the reports, he may have a feeling that
it does little else. It is rumored that there are clerks who
do nothing but look for possibilities of reversing death penal3. 385 u.s. 493, 17 L. Ed.2d 562, 87
S. Ct. 616 (1967).
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ties. Consider, for example, People v. Bandhauer.5 There
the court, using one of its common ploys, scanned the prosecutor's argument and found what it thought were objectionable remarks, although no objection had been made. Then
it went on by way of dictum to overrule numerous decisions,
some of which had resulted in executions. No longer will
the prosecutor have the closing argument in a proceeding to
determine sentence for murder under Penal Code section
190.1. Mr. Bumble could star on nearly every page of this
article. Meanwhile, the public defenders continue to exhaust
their meager budgets on death penalty cases. They complain,
usually privately, that they don't have enough left to do a
proper job on their other cases.
And then there was People v. Griffin. 6
Yes, this is the Griffin who was able to persuade the
Supreme Court of the United States that the long-standing
provision of the California Constitution allowing comment
on the failure of the defendant to take the stand should be
held invalid. 7 This year the results of his third trial arrived
at the California Supreme Court. As might be expected, the
court found a technical ground on which to reverse his death
penalty conviction. Evidence was admitted concerning an
attempted rape in Mexico, a charge on which the defendant
had been acquitted. Evidence of the acquittal was excluded.
This minor error was held to be prejudicial and the conviction
was reversed. Justices Burke and McComb dissented. Hopefully the prosecutor will try again. Meanwhile "waiting justice sleeps," as does Griffin's victim of seven years ago.
The California Supreme Court again upheld the separate
proceeding to determine sentence for murder provided for in
Penal Code section 190.1. It again rejected the contention
that the section is unconstitutional because no guidelines are
specified to assist the jury in determining whether the penalty
should be death or life imprisonment. 8 One may doubt that
5. 66 Cal.2d 524, 58 Cal. Rptr. 332,
426 P.2d 900 (1967).
6. 66 Cal.2d 459, 58 Cal. Rptr. 107,
426 P.2d 507 (1967).
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7. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
14 L. Ed.2d 106, 85 S. Ct. 1229 (1965).
8. People v. Seiterle, 65 Ca1.2d 333,
54 Cal. Rptr. 745, 420 P.2d 217 (1966).
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arty guidelines would have helped this defendant who apparently unnecessarily strangled a husband and wife in the course
of a $200 robbery. This is defendant Seiterle's fourth appearance before the court. 9 What a waste of judicial effort on
an admitted first-degree murder. Can there be no finality in
a California death penalty case? Seiterle's victims were murdered nearly eight years ago-quite finally.
Evidence, to be admissible in the Penal Code section 190.1
proceeding to determine whether capital punishment should
be assessed, must meet the standards of Penal Code section
1111 (the corroboration-of-accomplice section). In other
words, other robberies cannot be proven as aggravating circumstances by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice
in those robberies. 9a Another death penalty goes back for
retrial.
D. Post-Trial Proceedings
Motions after Trial
Sections 1118,1° 1118.111 and 1118.212 have been added to
the Penal Code to provide that the defendant can move for
a judgment of acquittal after the prosecution rests or at the
close of the evidence. The court can also acquit on its own
motion. Acquittal is a bar to further prosecution. The
former anomalous provision for an advised verdict is replaced
by the new procedure.
Sentencing
The Health and Safety Code, under certain of the narcotics
sections, requires denial of probation to a second-felony offender. The defendant in In re Sanchez 13 was convicted the
first time of possession of certain narcotics at a time when
9. People v. Seiterle, 56 Cal. 2d 320,
14 Cal. Rptr. 681, 363 P.2d 913 (1961);
59 Cal.2d 703, 31 Cal. Rptr. 67, 381
P.2d 947 (1963); In re Seiterle, 61 Cal.
2d 651, 39 Cal. Rptr. 716, 394 P.2d
556 (1964).
9a. People v. Varnum, 66 Cal.2d
808, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108, 427 P.2d 772
(1967).

10. Judgment of acquittal: Nonjury
case.
11. Same: Jury case.
12. Same: Appealability of judgment.
13. 65 Cal.2d 556, 55 Cal. Rptr. 422,
421 P.2d 430 (1966).
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the offense could be either a felony or a misdemeanor in
the discretion of the court. However, no "sentence" was ever
imposed, since he was committed to the Youth Authority.
The Supreme Court held that, under the statutes, as it then
interpreted them, the trial judge had no alternative but to
commit the defendant to a state prison upon his second
conviction.
The problem of double punishment under Penal Code section 654 continued to be troublesome. That section provides
that an act punishable under different provisions of the Penal
Code can only be punished under one of those provisions. It
is worded in terms of double jeopardy and should not require
reversal of a judgment where concurrent sentences are imposed
for the same act. However, the court rejected this notion
in Neal v. California,14 and the resulting morass of litigation
has caused much trouble.
In the case of In re Wright/ 5 the Supreme Court made
it quite clear that no longer can concurrent sentences violating
Penal Code section 654 be upheld as working no prejudice.
A number of court of appeal decisions to the contrary were
disapproved. A suggestion by the Attorney General that one
sentence be suspended was rejected.
Where defendant kidnaps A, B, and C for the purposes of
robbery, and also steals a safe, he can be convicted of three
kidnappings and the robbery. However, the concurrent burglary sentence could not be sustained. The court "directed"
the Adult Authority "to exclude the burglary sentence from
its consideration. "16
Another such case, In re McGrew/7 involved a burglary
after which the defendant raped the victim three times and
forced her into an act of oral copulation. He was convicted
on two counts of rape, one count under section 288 of
the Penal Code, and the burglary. The California Supreme
Court noted that on his entry he had told the victim he was
14. 55 Cal.2d 11, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607,
357 P.2d 839 (1960).
15. 65 Cal.2d 650, 56 Cal. Rptr.
110,422 P.2d 998 (1967).
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16. In re Ford, 66 Cal.2d at 184,
57 Cal. Rptr. at 129, 424 P.2d at 681
(1967).
17. 66 Cal.2d 685, 58 Cal. Rptr.
561, 427 P.2d 161 (1967).
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going to "have her in every way possible."18 It held that
under section 654 only the burglary conviction could stand.
Or consider the rather ridiculous decision in In re lohnson/ 9
where the court held that two sales of heroin to one customer,
one at 9:00 p.m. and one at 11 :00 p.m., constituted one act.
The court calls it a "single transaction." But section 654
speaks only in terms of the "same act," not transactions,
and the court extends this to what it recognizes as a "series
of acts."20
Of course, all of the facts are before the Adult Authority
anyway when it fixes the sentences. Isn't the court dreaming
when it "orders" the Authority to ignore an assault with a
deadly weapon on A (shooting and pistol whipping) in the
course of an armed robbery of B?l The Authority is going
to determine the sentence on the basis of the facts in the file.
Would it not be remiss in its statutory duties if it failed to consider such facts as more serious than a less complicated armed
robbery where only one victim is involved? Perhaps the
defendant in Neal may not be adjudged guilty of both arson
and attempted murder when he throws gasoline into an occupied bedroom and ignites it. Surely the Adult Authority
is going to consider the heinousness of the facts surrounding
the crime in determining sentence. One hopes that the Adult
Authority is adult enough to ignore this attempt of the California Supreme Court to interfere with its prerogatives. Surely
there should be something left of the doctrine of separation
of powers.
Perhaps the most pleasant aspect of the Neal problem is
that the court is basing the decision on a statute. So far it
is not based on constitutional law. The legislature still can
correct this judicial meandering.
Appeal
Where a defendant is convicted of three offenses and given
concurrent sentences, can he be retried and given consecutive
18. 66 Cal.2d at 687, 58 Cal. Rptr.
at 562, 427 P.2d at 162 (1967).
19. 65 Ca1.2d 393, 54 Cal. Rptr.
873, 420 P.2d 393 (1966).
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sentences if the conviction is reversed? This apparently novel
question was posed in People v. Ali.2 The court answered
it in the negative, modifying the judgment to make the sentences run concurrently. The court analogized its facts with
those in People v. Henderson. 3 In that case the court held
that a defendant who is given a life sentence is not required
to risk his life when he appeals what turns out to have been
an erroneous judgment. Both decisions seem clearly correct.
Where an information is dismissed by the court in a Penal
Code section 995 motion, the people can appeal. 4 Can they
simultaneously file a new indictment or information? In
Anderson v. Superior Court,5 the court was faced with a contention that this practice was unfair to the defendant, since
he would have to defend the appeal on the first information
and simultaneously prepare for trial on the second pleading.
The court took a middle ground. The prosecutor can take
both courses. However, he must elect between them as soon
as feasible. This election should be no later than the time
when the new pleading withstands a section 995 motion or
at the time of arraignment under it, whichever first occurs.
Parole
In the case of In re Schoengarth,6 the defendant asked if
he could be sent to Colorado to be tried under charges outstanding there. The Adult Authority fixed his sentence at
below the maximum on the condition that he go to Colorado
to stand trial. He then refused to accept the condition. The
Authority then reinstated his indeterminate sentence. The
California Supreme Court upheld the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Authority in fixing and redetermining indeterminate
sentences. Defendant's refusal to accept the condition of
parole constituted cause to refix his sentence.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/16

2. 66 Cal.2d 277, 57 Cal. Rptr. 348,
424 P.2d 932 (1967).

5. 66 Cal.2d 863, 59 Cal. Rptr. 426,
428 P.2d 290 (1967).

3. 60 Cal.2d 482, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77,
386 P.2d 677 (1963).
4. See Cal. Penal Code § 1238.

6. 66 Cal.2d 295, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600,
425 P.2d 200 (1967).
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Habeas Corpus
Is habeas corpus available to a defendant at large under
his own recognizance? The California Supreme Court was
faced with this issue in In re SmiZey.7 Smiley applied to the
California Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the
grounds, principally, that he had not been advised of his
right to counselor his right to a speedy trial. He was
released on his own recognizance by the court pending final
disposition. The Superior Court of Imperial County, at a
later hearing, denied habeas corpus and remanded defendant
to the custody of the sheriff. Defendant then applied for
habeas corpus to the Federal District Court, which ordered
him released on his own recognizance pending hearing on
the merits. The Federal District Court later ruled that the
defendant had not exhausted his state remedies, and denied
his application, but ordered that the defendant remain at liberty on his own recognizance pending rehearing by the California Supreme Court.
Justice Mosk, in a very informative opinion, stated that
it is settled that the use of habeas corpus has not been
restricted to situations in which the applicant is in actual
physical custody.
II. Criminal Law
Major crimes in California rose 8.7 percent in 1966 as
compared with 1965. During the same period the population increased 1.7 percent. Crime is increasing more than
five times as fast as the population. The rate of major crimes
during the same period rose from 2643.5 to 2825.7 per
100,000 persons. If the same rate of increase continues,
we can predict that the 1967 report will show one serious
crime for every 33 persons, including infants.s
Crime, whether on or off the streets, is the result of many
things. It has been my contention that one, if not the primary,
cause lies with the supreme courtS.9 In their efforts to protect
7. 66 Cal.2d 606, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579,
427 P.2d 179 (1967).
8. These figures are based on FBI,
Uniform Crime Reports-1966, p. 64.
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criminals they too often overlook the needs of the public and
its police. As has been seen, our California Supreme Court
has even developed a reputation of trying to anticipate the
United States Supreme Court.
What are some of the possible solutions to the problem?
One obviously is less tender loving care for the criminals.
More and more the police are being handcuffed. Our Supreme Court is somewhat handicapped because it is often
bound by United States Supreme Court decisions. But it
could use some restraint-if it wanted to. Another possible
solution might be to create a court of criminal appeal composed of experienced trial lawyers. Such a court has been
quite successful in England. Furthermore, this would give
the obviously overworked California Supreme Court more
time for civil cases. Alternately, we might limit its jurisdiction by requiring certification by the California Court of
Appeal before a case goes to the California Supreme Court,
perhaps allowing that court to take a case on its own motion
on the basis of a reported California Court of Appeal opinion.
The Supreme Court should not be required to hear stale
and meaningless habeas corpus cases which can be left to
the lower courts of appeal. An example is the multiple punishment problem, where the court spends countless hours
reviewing ancient claims based on records which will still
be considered by the Adult Authority despite directions to
the contrary from the California Supreme Court, and rightly
so.
lt would also be helpful if our Governor and President
showed concern for crime on the streets in their judicial
appointments, particularly to the supreme courts. One hopes
that Governor Reagan's and the President's future appointments show such concern.

Diminished Responsibility
The California doctrine of diminished responsibility continues to be increased in application. There seems to be a
growing tendency on the part of the California Supreme Court
in considering whether there is diminished responsibility to
402
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examine the personal turpitude of the defendant. In its
previous consideration of this doctrine, in People v. Wolfj,lO
the court felt that the defendant had ample time to deliberate
and premeditate. It felt that he knew the difference between
right and wrong. However, it also felt that his ability to
reflect upon the consequences of his act and to appraise
his moral turpitude was vague and detached. Citing People
v. Holt,11 the court emphasized the importance of the turpitude of the offender as a distinguishing factor between first
and second-degree murder.
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court, citing Wolfj,
again reduced convictions of first-degree murder to seconddegree murder. Thus in People v. Goedecke/ 2 where the
defendant was found guilty of the first-degree murder of his
father, and not guilty by reason of insanity of the murders
of his mother, brother, and sister, the conviction was reduced
to second-degree murder, despite ample evidence that the
crime was studiously planned and executed and conflicting
evidence by experts that his mental capacity was diminished.
As in W olfj, the court found that although the defendant knew
the difference between right and wrong and that the intended
act was wrong, the extent of his understanding, his reflection
on it and its consequences, with realization of the enormity
of the evil, was materially vague and detached and fell short
of the minimum requirements of first-degree murder, especially with respect to the quantum of reflection, comprehension, and turpitude of the offender.
In People v. Nicolaus,t3 the defendant murdered his three
children and was found guilty of first-degree murder. Once
again there were defense psychiatrists willing to testify that
his responsibility was diminished. Others testified to the contrary. In both cases, the court, with two dissenting Justices,
reduced the degree of the crime to second-degree murder.
Justice Burke, writing for the majority in Goedecke, took
pains to emphasize the "turpitude of the offender" language
10. 61 Cal.2d 795, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271,
394 P.2d 959 (1964).
11. 25 Cal.2d 59, 153 P.2d 21 (1944).
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of WolfJ. He said: "[T]he controlling issue as to degree
depends not alone on the character of the killing but also
on the question of personal turpitude of the actor.,,14 Justice
Mosk, McComb concurring, wrote a strong and well-reasoned
dissent in both Goedecke and Nicolaus. One may disagree
with the application of the "personal turpitude" measure to
the facts. However, perhaps one can agree that this is a
much more logical distinction between first and second-degree
murder than is the present terminology "wilful, deliberate,
and premeditated."
The court seemingly has no statutory method available to
it to change a death penalty to life imprisonment in the case
of first-degree murder. Penal Code section 126015 would
seem to allow modification of the sentence, but the court
has reached the contrary result in several decisions. 16 In
theory at least, the death penalty and life imprisonment are
equivalents. Section 1181 ( 6) 17 allows reduction of degree
where the evidence shows the defendant to be not guilty of
that degree. The court has refused to reduce the degree
in first-degree murder cases unless the evidence, insufficient
to show first-degree murder, did show second-degree murder. IS
I am not alone in finding the diminished responsibility
doctrine perplexing. 19 Perhaps what the court is doing is
finding a method of circumventing sections 1181 (6) and
14. 65 Cal.2d at 857, 56 Cal. Rptr.
at 630, 423 P.2d at 782.
15. Cal. Penal Code § 1260. Determination of appeal.
The court may reverse, affirm, or
modify a judgment or order appealed
from, or reduce the degree of the
offense or the punishment imposed,
and may set aside, affirm, or modify
any or all of the proceedings subsequent
to, or dependent upon, such judgment
or order, and may, if proper, order a
new trial.
16. See People v. Byrd, 42 Cal.2d
200, 213, 266 P.2d 505, 512 (1954) and
cases therein cited.
17. Cal. Penal Code § 1181(6) provides that when a verdict has been
404
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rendered or a finding made against a
defendant, the court may grant a new
trial when "the verdict or finding is
contrary to law or evidence, but if the
evidence shows the defendant to be
not guilty of the degree of the crime
of which he was convicted, but guilty
of a lesser degree thereof, or of a
lesser crime included therein, the court
may modify the verdict, finding or
judgment accordingly without granting
or ordering a new trial, and this power
shall extend to any court to which
the cause may be appealed; . . ."
18. Cf. People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d
164, 163 P.2d 8 (1945).
19. See, e.g., People v Hoxie, 252 Cal.
App.2d 967, 61 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967).
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1260. It is rather obvious from its actions that the majority
of the court opposes the death penalty. One way or another
it has prevented executions since January 1963, with one
exception. The court has accomplished what the legislature
refused to do. It has placed a moratorium on capital punishment, except for one scapegoat. 20
The court is very ingenious in its efforts to circumvent
executions as required by law of California. Its decisions
are subject to sudden about-faces. Precedents mean nothing.
One deputy district attorney said not long ago: "We are
supposed to play by the rules of the game. The trouble is
that they change the rules after the game is over." Consider,
for example, People v. Morse. l Morse involved the practice
of permitting the prosecutor to comment on and the court
to instruct on the fact that life imprisonment does not mean
life imprisonment, since there is eligibility for parole, often
in seven years. This practice dates back to at least 1931.
Numerous persons have been executed where there was comment and instruction on the possibility of parole. Isn't it
obvious that a jury has a right to know about the possibility
of parole and consider this in determining whether or not to
give a death penalty? The Adult Authority is far from
infallible. However, the court in Morse, groping for ways
to cut down or postpone death penalties, chose to overrule
this longtime practice. This, of course, is a head-in-the-sand
approach. Surely at least one member of every jury knows
of the possibility of parole and will communicate it to his
fellows. But changing the practice is a device to postpone
executions.
For many years the court has insisted that the jury must
have absolute discretion in its death penalty decision. It has
made cop.tinuous efforts to contain the People's argument
for the death penalty. Perhaps we are now due for another
about-face. Perhaps the court will soon say that Penal Code
section 190.1 is unconstitutional since it provides the jury
with no standards. This would not be unexpected. The court
20. Cf. Leviticus XVI.
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may even put on its blinders and declare that the death penalty
is a cruel and unusual punishment, ignoring the fact that
capital punishment is obviously within the contemplation of
both the Federal and State Constitutions. Both provide for
the deprivation of life with due process of law. 2
Intoxication

A defendant charged with assault with a deadly weapon3
is entitled to a jury instruction on simple assault under Penal
Code section 240 if he claims he was too drunk to know that
uniformed officers in a patrol car were peace officers. In
People v. Garcia,4 the defendant, on being questioned by
uniformed police officers, was unable to identify himself, and
appeared to be intoxicated. The officers decided to arrest
him, but the defendant broke away. Defendant found a stick
and struck the officers, finally being subdued after a struggle.
He later testified he was too drunk to recognize the officers
and had assumed the patrol wagon to be a truck. The court
found that when a defendant is on trial for assault with a
deadly weapon, if there is evidence to justify a charge of simple
assault, an instruction on the latter is mandatory, at least
where the defendant requests such an instruction. The court
recognized that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a
crime, but stated that the jury may consider the fact of intoxication whenever the actual existence of a particular purpose,
motive, or intent is a necessary element. 5
Mistake

The California Supreme Court, in a five-to-two decision in
People v. Butler,6 reaffirmed the doctrine7 that claim of right
2. See, e.g., People v. Bandhauer,
66 Cal.2d 524, 58 Cal. Rptr. 332, 426
P.2d 900 (1967), where the court selects
a few isolated remarks of the prosecutor
and finds reversible error, and then
goes on to render a gratuitous dictum
to the effect that the prosecutor can no
longer have a right to close in a Penal
Code § 190.1 proceeding.
406
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3. See Cal. Penal Code § 245(b).
4. 250 Cal. App.2d 15, 58 Cal. Rptr.
186 (1967).
5. See Cal. Penal Code § 22.
6. 65 Cal.2d 569, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511,
421 P.2d 703 (1967).
7. See People v. Rosen, 11 Cal.2d
147, 78 P.2d 727, 116 A.L.R. 991
(1938).
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is a defense to a charge of armed robbery, even where the
robbery results in a homicide. The defendant claimed he only
intended to collect money due him for wages and that his
gun went off accidentally. The prosecutor was permitted,
over objection, to argue that it is still robbery even if one's
intention is only to recover money he claims to be owed him.
The majority expressed the view that the defendant's objection
was well taken, reasoning that robbery requires that the taking
be felonious and thus a bona fide belief of the defendant, even
if mistaken, that he had the right to the property is a valid
defense since it negates the felonious intent. Justice Mosk,
dissenting, felt that in "a bucolic western scene or in the
woolly atmosphere of the frontier in the nineteenth century,
the six-shooter may have been an acceptable device for do-ityourself debt collection," but that "a might-makes-right doctrine
is of dubious adaptability to urban society
in this final third of the twentieth century."s He quite properly pointed out that Penal Code section 211, on robbery
upon which the felony-murder prosecution was based, raises
no issue of ownership of the property taken. It requires only
that it be taken forcibly from the "possession" of another.
Justice McComb concurred. Both dissenters also felt that
there was no prejudicial error, and certainly none was shown
by the facts as stated in the majority opinion. However,
the majority felt that there was prejudicial error per se because
the prosecutor's argument deprived the defendant of his right
to have all "significant" issues determined by a jury.
Homicide
Can a parent be convicted of manslaughter for failing to
obtain medical assistance when needed by a child? In People
v. Arnold,9 the defendant belonged to the Church of the First
Born,. which believes in faith healing. Her daughter was
painfully ill over a number of days as the result of a blocked
small intestine. The medical evidence was to the effect that
she could have been saved until very close to the time she
8. 65 CaI.2d at 577, 55 Cal. Rptr.
at 517, 421 P.2d at 709.
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9. 66 Cal.2d 438, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115,
426 P.2d 515 (1967).
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died. The theory of the prosecution was that a conviction
could be obtained if defendant violated Penal Code section
270 (omission to furnish necessary medical assistance) or
section 272 (failure to provide necessities), if the defendant
knew or "should have known" of the danger of death. Although the court reversed on procedural grounds, in no way
did it object to the theory of the prosecution's case. The
question of culpability of a person who believes in faith healing is a very fascinating philosophical problem. 10 Such a
person is negligent if a reasonable person would not have
held such a belief. But one may question whether such a
person is culpable and whether the purposes of the criminal
law are served by confining her to the county jail for one
year. For that matter, one may raise the question whether
any person should be punished for negligent homicide. In
this case, without convicting her of manslaughter, she could
easily be convicted of violations of Penal Code section 270
or 272 and still be sent to the county jail for one year. Perhaps the latter procedure is more rational.

Assault
In People v. Hoxie/ 1 the court of appeal held that an
assault with intent to commit murder could be an assault
with "intent" to commit second-degree murder. However,
it seemingly limited this doctrine to murders involving an
intent to kill. One defense was diminished responsibility.
The court was troubled by the distinctions drawn between first
and second-degree murder by the California Supreme Court.
(Aren't we all?) However, it held that even here, absent
evidence of diminished responsibility, the defendant could
have been found guilty of second-degree murder had the
assault been successful. The conviction was affirmed.
10. See, e.g., Trescher and O'Neill,
Medical Care for Dependent Children:
Manslaughter Liability of the Christian
Scientist, 109 PA. L. REV. 203 (1960).
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Conspiracy

Penal Code section 182 (5) makes it a crime to conspire
to "commit any act injurious to the public health, to public
morals, or to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws." One may question the need for this
provision since the cases, except possibly for the obstruction
of justice portion, seem invariably to include the commission
of or conspiracy to commit crimes. In People v. Rehman,12
the constitutionality of the provision was questioned on the
"void for vagueness" doctrine. The essence of the charge
was conspiracy to practice medicine without a licenseincluding such things as surgery, delivering babies, and similar matters. Judge Kincaid, a retired California Superior
Court judge sitting pro tempore, wrote a very fine opinion
upholding the constitutionality of the statute.
Obstructing an Officer
The defendant in People v. COOkS18 was charged with a

violation of Penal Code section 148, obstructing an officer
in the discharge of his duties. The officer was trying to
question a robbery suspect in a bar. The defendant bartender
repeatedly told the suspect not to answer any questions and
not to show identification. The suspect followed defendant's
advice despite the officer's repeated verbal attempts to quiet
the defendant. The trial court, at the close of the evidence,
dismissed the charge on the ground that the facts showed
constitutionally protected speech. The State successfully
appealed. The Appellate Department of the San Diego
Superior Court said that the defendant had deliberately set
out to obstruct a police officer and had succeeded in his
purpose, and that such speech-conduct is not constitutionally
protected.
12. 253 Cal. App.2d 117, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 65 (1967).
13. 250 Cal. App.2d - , 58 Cal.

Rptr. 550 (case subsequently transferred
to Court of Appeals and certified for
nonpublication July 13, 1967).
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Perjury
In People v. Walker,14 the defendant, an aluminum siding

contractor, was convicted of perjury growing out of sworn
statements before a notary. He would swear before the notary
that he had witnessed signatures when in fact he had not. The
conviction was affirmed. It is a well-known fact that many
notaries are rather lax about formalities. All of us have
experienced such laxity. What the solution is, I am not sure.
One possibility might be to do away with notaries.
Trespass; Disorderly Conduct
In People v. Wilkinson/ 5 four persons went through a fence

onto private property without consent and made their way
to a beach. There they improvised a tarp campsite complete
with sleeping bags and fire over which they were preparing
their breakfast when arrested. They were convicted of a
violation of Penal Code section 602 (1), which makes "entering and occupying" real property without the consent of the
owner a misdemeanor. The court reversed, holding that
the section applies only to nontransient continuous occupation. It suggested that section 602.5 would not apply either,
since no structure was employed. Perhaps it was because of
this decision and the hippie invasion generally that Penal Code
section 647(h) was adopted in 1967. That subsection makes
it disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor, to lodge in "any building, structure or place, whether public or private" without
permission.
Abortion16

The legislature enacted a so-called Therapeutic Abortion
Act/7 which became effective November 8, 1967, after the
period covered by this article. The Act permits a physician
to perform an abortion in a hospital when approved by a
14. 247 Cal. App.2d 554,
Rptr. 726 (1967), cert. denied
- , 19 L. Ed.2d '77, 88 S.
(1967).
15. 248 Cal. App.2d Supp.
Cal. Rptr. 261 (1967).
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16. See Leavy, California's New
Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Analysis and Guide to Medical and Legal
Procedure, 15 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1967).
17. Cal. Health & Safety Code § §
25950-25954.
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hospital committee if there is a risk to the physical or mental
health of the mother, or if the pregnancy resulted from rape
or incest. Provisions are made for prosecutor opinions and
court hearings on the matter of rape or incest. Statutory
rape is excluded from the definition of rape, unless the girl
is under the age of fifteen.
Penal Code section 274 is unchanged. Thus, a physician
still has a defense that the abortion was necessary to preserve
life. One may doubt that the Act is more than a token
approach to the problem, which involves healthy women,
married or unmarried, who want abortions, as well as victims
of rapes and incest. They still may be forced to go to the
Tijuana butchers. One may predict that the law will be
stretched to take care of some of their problems. IS It will
be interesting to see how it works in practice.
Indecent Exposure
People v. Merriam I9 is worthy of note largely because of a
very brave victim, a Mrs. Alyce Wolf. She discovered the
defendant exposing himself in a basement storeroom and
ordered him to leave. When he would not, she attempted to
move him by force. She finally succeeded after calling
police, who arrived shortly after his departure.
There is also a point of law in the Merriam decision. Although indecent exposure is not like some sex crimes where
fabrication is a danger, the shocking nature of the acts might
lead to hasty identification. Therefore a cautionary instruction must be given to the effect that in prosecutions for sex
offenses, including indecent exposure, accusations are easy
to make and difficult to prove. The jury should be told that
the testimony of complaining witnesses should be viewed with
caution. Failure to give such an instruction, whether requested or not, is error.
18. Doubtless the word will get
around that a woman who can convince her physician or psychiatrist that
she contemplates suicide can obtain a
Of course, if
therapeutic abortion.
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she can't afford a physician or psychiatrist, she can go ahead and have her
unwanted baby.
19. 66 Cal.2d 390, 58 Cal. Rptr. 1,
426 P.2d 161 (1967).
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Fortunately, in Merriam the evidence was solid. The
identification by Mrs. Wolf was quite positive. The court for
once applied Article VI, section 13 and held that the error
was harmless.
Bravo Mrs. Wolf! God Bless You.
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